How do neighbors influence investment in social capital? : Homeownership and length of residence by Yamamura, Eiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How do neighbors influence investment
in social capital? : Homeownership and
length of residence
Eiji Yamamura
1. August 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24255/
MPRA Paper No. 24255, posted 7. August 2010 02:14 UTC
1 
 
How do neighbors influence investment in social 
capital? Homeownership and length of residence.  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses individual data from Japan to explore how the 
circumstances of where a person resides are related to the degree of their 
investment in social capital. Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed effects 
and various individual characteristics, I found; (1) Not only that homeownership 
and length of residence are positively related to investment in social capital, but 
also that rates of homeownership and long-time residency in a locality increase an 
individual‟s investments in social capital. (2) The effects of local neighborhood 
homeownership and local length of residence are distinctly larger than those of an 
individual‟s homeownership or length of residence.  
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Introduction 
It is increasingly acknowledged that social capital plays a critical role in human 
behavior, thereby influencing economic outcomes (e.g., Putnam 1993, 2000; 
Fukuyama 1995)1. Researchers in the field of regional studies have recently drawn 
attention to the issue of social capital (e.g., Glaeser and Redlick 2008; Kilkenny 
2006; Westlund 2007). Based on standard economic theory, social capital formation 
can be analyzed using an investment model where the amount of social capital 
depends on an individual‟s decision regarding investment (Glaeser et al. 2002). By 
considering the spatial dimension, empirical works have attempted to investigate 
how social capital is accumulated based on individual decision making; suggesting 
homeowners are more likely to invest in social capital as a result of their lower 
mobility rates (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2010). On the other hand, 
evidence has been presented that household social ties with neighbors, which can 
be regarded as a kind of social capital, generate benefits for residents2. This benefit 
disappears if a household moves, reinforcing low residential mobility (Kan 2007). 
This indicates that individual decision making is influenced by the degree of 
accumulated social capital among neighbors. It follows from arguments such as 
those above that under circumstances where a larger amount of social capital is 
formed, a person is less likely to move and hence is more inclined to invest in social 
capital.  
 Not only an individual‟s features but also neighbor characteristics are expected 
to have a critical effect on individual behavior concerning individual investment in 
social capital3. Few researchers, with the exception of DiPasquale and Glaeser 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999), attempt to investigate the effects of 
homeownership and the length of residence on individual investment in social 
capital. Furthermore, although investment in social capital appears affected by 
                                                   
1 Some works have criticized the ambiguity of the definition of social capital and pointed out 
drawbacks in measurement (e.g., Paldam 2000; Durlauf 2002a, 2002b). 
2 Social network considered as social capital appears to make a contribution to technological 
diffusion among colleagues (Yamamura 2008a). 
3 It is found that people are less inclined to cooperate to resolve collective problems in more 
heterogeneous communities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Yamamura 2008b). 
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socio-economic conditions, investigations have not been conducted outside of 
Western countries. How social capital is accumulated in countries outside the West 
needs to be investigated to determine the extent to which socio-economic conditions 
influence results. This paper uses individual level data from Japan to investigate 
not only the effects of individual homeownership and the length of residence, but 
also those of neighbors, and then compares the former with the latter.  
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows: In section 2, a 
simple theoretical model is presented. Section 3 describes data, the method of 
analysis and the estimation strategies. The results of the estimations and their 
interpretation are provided in section 4. The final section offers concluding 
remarks. 
 
Basic model 
In this paper, social capital is considered to be formed through aggregated 
individual investment for social activities such as involvement in a neighborhood 
association. Furthermore, this paper is based on the idea that rational behavior 
taken by an individual leads to investment in social capital (Glaeser et al., 2002)4.  
In the model, individual social capital is represented as the stock of a variable, 
S . Each individual gets a per-period utility flow of  ,HSR  where  HR  is a 
differentiable function with neighbor (or individual) immobility.  HSR  captures 
market returns. It is known that an interpersonal social network and trust are 
formed through long-term interactions among people, resulting in a decrease in 
transaction cost (Hayami, 2001). It seems reasonably argued that the lack of 
population mobility leads to stable and long-term interpersonal relationships. 
Accordingly, I assume   0' HR .  
The social capital stock follows the dynamic budget constraint, ttt ISS  1  . 
1  represents the depreciation rate. The level of investment in t period, tI , has a 
time cost  tIC , where  C  is increasing and convex. The opportunity cost of time 
is,w , which represents the wage rate if the labor supply is inelastic. Individuals 
                                                   
4 Glaeser et al (2002) applies standard optimal investment to analyze the social capital 
formation. 
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discount the future with a discount factor . Individual lifespan is denoted as T. An 
individual‟s maximization problem can be expressed as: 
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An individual maximizes their objective function, taking H as fixed. The 
first-order condition associated with this investment problem is given by: 
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This first-order condition suggests a comparative statistic result. Social capital 
increases with neighbor (or individual) immobility, H. It follows from this result 
that neighbor (or individual) homeownership and length of residence are positively 
associated with an individuals‟ investment in social capital. However, it is unclear 
whether the effects of neighbor immobility on an individual‟s investment are larger 
than those of individual immobility. To examine this, empirical estimations are 
conducted in the following sections. 
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
This paper used individual level data containing information related to areas 
such as social capital index, years of living at the current address, homeownership, 
demographic (age and sex) and economic (occupation, household income) status5. 
These data were constructed from the Social Policy and Social Consciousness 
(SPSC) survey conducted in all parts of Japan in 2000. Five thousand adults (aged 
20 years old or older) were invited to participate in a survey that utilized stratified 
two-stage random sampling. As shown in Table 1, the survey collected data on 3991 
adults, a response rate of 79.8 %. Respondents did not respond to all the questions 
used to construct the variables used in estimations. Therefore, the number of 
                                                   
5 The data for this secondary analysis, "Social Policy and Social Consciousness survey (SPSC), 
Shogo Takekawa," were provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information 
Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of 
Tokyo. 
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observations was reduced to 3075, which were used for the regression estimations 
reported in Tables 4 and A1. Sample points were divided into 11 areas. In each area, 
according to their population size, cities and towns are divided into 4 groups such 
as the 13 metropolitan cities, cities with 200 000 people or greater, cities with 100 
000 people or greater, and towns and villages. Therefore, 4 population groups exist 
within each of the 11 areas. Hence, area-population groups can be divided into 44, 
which are defined as local groups in this paper. As shown later, variables to capture 
neighbor characteristics are calculated in accord with these local groupings.6. 
Table 2 includes variable definitions and basic statistics. Following the 
discussion in Putnam (2000), the degree of civic engagement is considered as 
investment for social capital in this research. Thus, social capital was measured 
using the question “Are you actively involved in the activity of a neighborhood 
association?” Responses ran from 0 (not at all) to 3 (Yes, actively involved). This 
measure, however, reflects only a facet of the investments made in social capital 
because, besides the activity of a neighborhood association, various other 
community activities are thought to be connected with the accumulation of social 
capital. Other reports have used similar measures as a proxy for social capital 
investment. DiPasquale & Glaeser (1999) used the General Social Survey (the 
GSS) conducted in the United States. They used various variables as proxies for 
social capital7. These variables were, however, not purposefully collected and so 
were not fully suited to the examination of investment for social capital. Hilber 
(2010) used the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS), the first 
attempt at widespread systematic measurement of social capital in the United 
States. Hilber (2010) focused on four measures of individual social capital 
investment for their estimation: (1) participation in neighborhood associations, (2) 
the number of social interactions with immediate neighbors, (3) the number of 
                                                   
6 According to the data used in this research, 4 areas do not contain metropolitan cities. Thus, 
only 40 local groups exist in the data. 
7 For instance; (1) membership of nonprofessional organizations, (2) knowing the names of 
local political luminaries (the head of the local school board and the local U.S. representative), 
(3) voting in local elections, (4) church attendance, (5) gardening, and (6) trying to solve local 
problems. 
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social interactions with co-workers outside work, and (4) participation in service 
and fraternal organizations. In the case of Japan, further work using additional 
proxies for examination of social capital investment will be needed to confirm the 
robustness of this paper. 
Homeowner was measured using the question “What is your type of 
residence?” The responses were “I own my home,” “I reside in a home owned by my 
parents” and “other”. For the basic estimation, I defined homeownership as being a 
home owned by an individuals or their parent/s.  
 
Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
I see from Table 3 (1) that a homeowner is significantly more likely to invest in 
social capital. Table 3 (2) shows that a person living at their current address longer 
than 20 years is more inclined to invest in social capital. These results are in line 
with the evidence provided by earlier report that barriers to mobility give 
individuals an incentive to investment in social capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser 
1999; Hilber 2010).  
I now explore how the local circumstance of individuals, captured by neighbor 
homeownership and length of residence, are related to an individuals‟ investment 
in social capital. Following the model used by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), the 
estimated function takes the following form: 
SC im= 0 + 1 HOME im+ 2LIVE20im +3LIVE10im +4AVHOMEim 
+5AVLIVE20im+6AVLIVE10im+7CHILDim+8MARRIim+9DIVm+10AGEim+11I
NCOMEim+12UNIVim+13MALEim+em+ uim , 
where SC im represents the dependent variable in resident i, and area m. ‟s 
represents regression parameters. em represents unobservable area specific effects 
that are controlled by dummy variables. uim represents the error term. In addition 
to the OLS model, the Ordered Probit model is also employed. The dependent 
variable is qualitative and ranges from 0 to 3. Theoretically, because of the ordinal 
nature of dependent variables, Ordered Probit analysis appears appropriate 
(Greene 1997, CH19). 
Individual homeownership dummy, HOME, is used to capture the homeowner 
effect. If a homeowner tends to invest in social capital, the anticipated sign of 
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HOME is positive. As discussed by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), HOME is 
possibly correlated with unmeasured factors included in uim. HOME is thus 
thought to be an endogenous variable, resulting in estimation bias8. A person 
residing in a home owned by a parent is less likely to suffer endogenous bias since 
it is exogenously determined whether a parent is a homeowner or not. Therefore, I 
omit the samples where an individual is the homeowner and newly define the 
dummy variable, which takes 1 if one‟s parent is the homeowner, otherwise 0, as 
HOME, to conduct alternative estimations aiming to alleviate endogenous bias9. To 
capture the effect of length of residence, individual long resident dummies such as 
LIVE20 and LIVE 10 are used10. According to Kan (2007), length of residence can 
be considered as the degree of integration into the neighborhood. People integrated 
into the neighborhood are thought to be inclined to invest in social capital since the 
return from the investment is expected to be large. Hence, coefficients of LIVE20 
and LIVE10 are predicted to take the positive signs. What is more, longer time 
residents are more inclined to invest in social capital so that the magnitude of 
LIVE20 is anticipated to be larger than LIVE10.  
The rate of neighborhood homeownership can be regarded as the degree of local 
                                                   
8 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) considered the average group homeownership rate as an 
exogenous variable and used it as an instrument variable. Similar results are obtained if the 
same estimation method is employed using the data used for this research, although 
estimation results are not reported. I regard such a group average variable as more useful for 
capturing the neighborhood effect as an independent variable. 
9 Sample size is 3075 when all observations are used for estimations. As shown in Table 1, 
observations are 2349 when HOME takes 1. Thus, the homeownership rate in the sample is 
76%. More precisely, the 2349 homeownerships are made up of 1878 “individual” ownership 
and 471 of “parent” ownership. Therefore, the sample size used in the alternative estimations 
becomes 1197 since the individual homeownership observations are omitted. In this case, the 
parent homeownership rate becomes 39%. In short, the sample used in estimations of Tables 4 
and A1 is divided into the sample of individual homeowners and others. The sample excluding 
individual owners is used for estimations in Tables 5 and A2.  
10 A continuous variable that captures the number of years at home is not available. However,, 
LIVE10 and LIVE20 are available and so were used in this paper. A continuous variable has 
more precise information about the length of residence and so should be used in a future study. 
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population immobility, since homeownership creates a barrier to mobility. As a 
consequence, homeowners have a tendency to invest in social capital (DiPasquale 
and Glaeser 1999). By definition, the rate of long-time residence is also thought to 
reflect local population immobility. Long-time residents are likely to have 
long-term relationships with neighbors since people will move if they fail to 
construct good relationships with their neighbors 11 . Hence, neighborhood 
homeownership and length of residence are thought to be proxies for accumulated 
social capital. Neighborhood homeownership and length of residence are measured 
by group average HOME rate (AVHOME) and group average LIVE20 and LIVE10 
rates (AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10) within a local group, respectively. To exclude an 
individual i‟ s effect from i‟ s local group average, i‟ s sample is omitted from the 
samples when local average values are calculated. These variables would take 
positive signs if ample social capital within a community where a person resides 
encourages a person to invest in social capital. 
People with children are likely to have opportunities to interact with other 
parents through PTA meetings and various events for children held by community 
associations, leading the sign for CHILD to become positive. Several control 
variables are also included to capture individual characteristics: marital status, 
age, male‟s dummy, and university graduation dummy. 
 
Estimation Results and their Interpretation 
Tables 3 and A1 presented in the Appendix report results using all samples. 
Alternative estimation results are presented in Tables 4 and A2, where I omit 
samples where a person is the homeowner and use the dummy variable, which 
takes 1 if a parent is the homeowner, otherwise it takes 0, as HOME. If 
homeownership creates a barrier to mobility, the length of residence is correlated 
with homeownership, resulting in multicollinearity. Therefore, in Tables 3, 4, A1, 
and A2, column (3) reports results when AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10 are excluded, 
and column (4) results when AVHOME is excluded to compare the full model in 
                                                   
11 People would suffer from ostracism if they infringe social norms considered as local rules, 
leading to people following norms (Hayami 2001). Such a „community mechanism‟ seems to be, 
to a certain extent, effective even in modern Japanese society (Yamamura 2008c). 
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column (2) with columns (3) and (4). 
I now discuss Table 4 that shows the results of OLS estimations. Looking at the 
first row shows that HOME has positive signs in all estimations, and is 
statistically significant at the 1 % level. This implies that a homeowner is more 
likely to invest in social capital, which is consistent with DiPasquale and Glaeser 
(1999). As anticipated, LIVE20 and LIVE10 yield positive signs in all estimations 
although LIVE10 is not statistically significant. As anticipated, the magnitude of 
LIVE20 is obviously larger than that of LIVE10. It follows from this that a barrier 
to mobility caused by individual characteristics enhances social capital investment. 
With respect to neighbor effects captured by AVHOME, AVLIVE20, and AVLIVE10, 
AVHOME produces significant positive signs in columns (2) and (3). It is also 
interesting to observe that the values of AVHOME are about 4 times larger than 
those of HOME, which implies that neighbor homeownership makes a greater 
contribution to increases in social capital formation than does individual 
homeownership. AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10 show positive signs, despite being 
statistically insignificant in column (2). If AVHOME is excluded, as exhibited in 
column (4), both continue to yield positive signs and AVLIVE20 becomes 
statistically significant at the 1 % level. Consistent with the prediction, AVLIVE20 
is larger than ALIVE10. What is more, values of AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10 are 
clearly larger than LIVE20 and LIVE10. Therefore, the neighbor length of 
residence effect is thought to be larger than the individual‟s length of residence 
effect. CHILD shows the anticipated positive sign and is statistically significant at 
the 1 % level, suggesting parents are more likely to being integrated into the 
community, such as through involvement with the PTA. Most of the results 
concerning other variables, with the exception of UNIV which takes negative signs, 
are consistent with existing work (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). 
 I now turn to the results of Table 5 where samples are restricted. I concentrate 
attention on homeownership and length of residence. In all estimations, HOME 
and LIVE20 continue to exhibit significant positive signs although LIVE10 
becomes negative. When I compare these with the full sample estimations seen in 
Table4, the values of HOME are slightly over 0.20 and are almost at the same level 
as HOME shown in Table 4. Those of LIVE20 are 0.12, larger than those of LIVE20 
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in Table 4. Overall, the results of individual homeownership and length of 
residence are robust when the endogenous bias of HOME is controlled for. As for 
AVHOME, it produces the expected positive signs and is statistically significant at 
the 1 % level. Values of AVHOME are approximately 1, almost the same as those of 
AVHOME in Table 4. Both ALIVE20 and ALIVE10 take positive signs and 
ALIVE20 in column (4) is statistically significant at the 1 % level. Compared with 
the full sample estimations in Table 4, values of AVLIVE 20 are almost the same as 
in Table 4, while values of AVLIVE10 show 0.60, larger than ALIVE10 in Table 4. 
Considering what has been observed overall in Table 3 and, the effects of neighbor 
homeownership and length of residence are distinctly larger than those of an 
individual‟s homeownership effects, and continue to be held after alleviating the 
endogenous bias of individual homeownership. I can derive the argument from this 
that individuals are inclined to invest in social capital under circumstances where 
their community is a tightly knitted one based on long-term social ties with 
neighbors. In other words, a large amount of accumulated social capital enhances 
an individual‟s investment in social capital.  
In the case of the United States, local homeownership rate is not associated with 
individual social capital investment (DiPasquale and Glaeser1999. p.376)12. Thus 
evidence from the United States is contrary to that from Japan presented in this 
research. There are other situations that effect surrounding people that seem to be 
differ between Japan and the United States. For instance, it is found that 
generational heterogeneity has a detrimental effect on collective action in the 
United States (Vigdor 2004). On the other hand, generational heterogeneity has a 
positive effect on collective action in Japan (Yamamura 2008d)13. One explanation 
is that this might be in part because of the reputed harmonious nature of Japanese 
society (Kawashima, 1963). However, it is not clear why there are differences from 
the viewpoint of economics in the effect of surrounding people on individual 
behavior. This needs to be investigated in future work. 
                                                   
12 DiPasquale and Glaeser “generate an estimate of the local homeownership rate by 
calculating the average homeownership rate in each city-size category in each state” 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999, p.377).  
13 Generational heterogeneity also increases social trust in Japan (Yamamura 2008e). 
11 
 
As shown in the APPENDIX, the results of Ordered Probit estimations shown 
in Tables A1 and A2 correspond to those of the OLS estimations in Tables 3 and 4, 
respectively. The results obtained by Ordered Probit estimations are similar to the 
OLS estimations, implying that the results of OLS are robust to alternative 
estimations and therefore strongly support the argument noted above. 
 
Discussion 
A benefit from social capital is that there is a reduction in transaction costs and 
the enhancement of collective action to deter people from free riding. Hence, 
market failure can be coped with by social capital considered as local public goods 
(Hayami 2001). Social capital thus appears to improve economic efficiency and 
leads to economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997, Hall and Jones 1999). 
Long-term personal interactions within a community will deteriorate gradually 
under conditions where the market functions well because newcomers become 
community members. If the community is closed to newcomers, a newcomer is less 
likely to invest for social capital even if the social capital is large. As a consequence, 
social capital will be diminished over time. If this is true, the development of a 
market will impede the accumulation of social capital. Based on a similar logic, 
using a trading model to investigate the connection between the growth in labor 
mobility and social capital, Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) indicated that social 
capital increased at the expense of an efficient mobile labor force. Even if, as 
generally believed, a community is closed to strangers, it is induced to open up and 
adjust to modern socio-economic environments under pressure from nation-wide or 
global economic integration. In short, social capital within a community relies on 
its particular circumstances, especially during a transition period.  
Annen (2001, 2003) developed a concept of social capital governance that 
distinguishes between inclusive and exclusive social capital14. Exclusive social 
capital creates market segmentation while inclusive enhances interactions among 
different groups15. It was argued that inclusive social capital furthers economic 
                                                   
14 Annen (2001) argued that the exclusive social capital induces the rent-seeking activity. 
15 Knack (2003) made it evident that the positive effect of the inclusive social capital is 
observed while the negative effect of exclusive social capital is not observed. 
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performance while exclusive may not. Here, I suggest another scenario. If a 
community is open to newcomers and social capital is abundant, not only existing 
members but also newcomers are more likely to invest for social capital. As a result, 
greater social capital will be accumulated. Policy makers need to ensure 
communities are open to newcomers and in this way enhance the subsequent 
accumulation of social capital when the market functions well. For instance, local 
government measures the degree to which newcomers participate in community 
activities and then provides subsidies for community activities or gives recognition 
to communities where the newcomer participation rate is high. This policy is 
thought to make a community open to newcomers, resulting in an increase in social 
capital investment through newcomer participation. 
If the community is open to newcomers, there are problems such as “Is the 
impact on the openness of a community different if the newcomer is Japanese or an 
immigrant?”, “What is the impact of a newcomer on social capital formation if that 
person comes from another community which was either rich or poor in social 
capital?” As argued by Vigdor (2004), people in the United States are less likely to 
take collective action when they live in an area where there is a high degree of 
socio-economic, racial, and generational heterogeneity. Japan is characterized by a 
racially homogenous society unlike that of the United States. Yamamura (2010) 
presented evidence that the frequency of contact with foreigners makes people‟s 
perceptions more elastic to the effects of increases in the number of foreigners and 
that the effect of contact with foreigners on perceptions depends on the 
respondents‟ income level. Therefore, responses of community members to 
foreigners might be influenced by foreigners already present in the community, 
along with the average income level of the community. Therefore, the effect of 
community openness on the Japanese newcomer seems to be different from the 
effect of foreign newcomers. The circumstances existing where people live are 
thought to partly form their patterns of behavior through interpersonal interaction. 
However, it is unknown how and the extent to which the features of the country or 
the community where a newcomer previously lived influence social capital 
formation. In the present situation, in which the number of recent immigrants has 
increased remarkably in Japan (Yamamura, 2010), it is interesting and important 
13 
 
to explore these issues. 
 
Conclusions 
How and the extent to which the incentive to invest in social capital increases 
when individuals own their home has been well investigated. However, little is 
known about the effects of a neighbor‟s homeownership on individual investment 
in social capital. This paper aims to explore how the circumstances of where a 
person resides are related to the degree of their own investment in social capital 
using data of the 3 075 adult participants in the 2000 Social Policy and Social 
Consciousness (SPSC) survey. This paper is the first to apply the framework of 
Glaeser et al (2002) to examine whether a neighborhood‟s characteristics influence 
individual investment for social capital in Japan. Controlling for unobserved 
area-specific fixed effects and various individual characteristics, I found;  
(1) Not only that an individual‟s homeownership and length of residence are 
positively related to their investment in social capital, but also that the rates of 
homeownership and long-time residence in a locality increase an individual‟s 
investments in social capital.  
(2) The effect of local neighbor homeownership and length of residence are 
remarkably larger than that of an individual‟s homeownership.  
Empirical study provided evidence that the effect of a neighborhood‟s 
immobility on social capital formation is larger than those of an individual‟s when 
a person makes a decision regarding investment. What came out most clearly from 
this investigation was that not only an individual„s characteristics but also positive 
externality stemming from neighborhood immobility have crucial roles in social 
capital formation and thus should be considered in any study related to social 
capital. The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence that 
accumulation of social capital in a locality leads to individuals investing more for 
social capital. In the case of the United States presented by DiPasquale and 
Glaeser (1999), the rate of homeownership in a locality does not increase individual 
investment in social capital; implying that social capital in a locality does not 
encourage individuals to invest for social capital. 
The endogenous problem of homeownership appears to cause estimation bias 
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but was not sufficiently controlled in this study. Therefore, suitable instruments 
need to be determined and then two-stage estimation conducted. Furthermore, this 
study was limited to Japan and the findings provided thus far cannot be easily 
generalized. The findings of this study are not fully congruent with the findings 
from the United States. (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). To better verify the 
generality of the arguments presented here, study comparing results from other 
countries with different socio-cultural backgrounds needs to be conducted using 
larger sample sizes. Furthermore, how the effect on a community of a newcomer‟s 
characteristics influence the formation of social capital is not well known and so 
should be explored. These are issues remaining to be addressed in future studies. 
Obtaining data about social capital across countries and cultures in a way that 
would enable comparisons would be difficult to achieve. However, this could 
possibly be done in the United States at the census level; for example, one could 
measure how differences in the ethnic or cultural makeup of communities influence 
the kinds of social capital invested in, as well as the factors that influence those 
investments. We believe the current analysis focused on Japan will complement 
studies of Western economies. 
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TABLE 1.  
 Construction of the research sample 
 Description Observations 
Original Sample 
 
  3991 
Sample includes various variables used in 
the estimation: Sample (I) 
  3075 
Within Sample (I), respondents are 
individual homeowners. 
  1878 
Within Sample (I), respondents are not 
individual homeowners: Sample (II) 
  1197 
Note.  
Sample (I) was used for the estimations in Tables 4 and A1. Sample (II) was used 
for the estimations in Tables 5 and A2. 
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TABLE 2 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
 
Note:  a 10 Million yen   
 
Variables 
 
Definition Mean Max Min 
SC The degree of involvement in the activities of a 
neighborhood association runs from 0 (not at 
all) to 3 (actively involved).  
1.35 3 0 
HOME 
 
Takes 1 if one is a homeowner, otherwise takes 
0. 
 
0.76 1 0 
LIVE20 Takes 1 if a person has lived at their current 
address for longer than 20 years, otherwise 
takes 0. 
0.62 1 0 
LIVE10 Takes 1 if a person has lived at their current 
address for between 10 and 20 years, otherwise 
takes 0. 
0.17 1 0 
AVHOME Average value of HOME within an area. (Total 
HOME in the locality minus own 
HOME)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.76 0.98 0.43 
AVLIVE20 Average value of LIVE20 within an area. (Total 
LIVE20 in the locality minus own 
LIVE20)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.61 0.89 0.26 
AVLIVE10 Average value of LIVE10 within an area. (Total 
LIVE10 in the locality minus own 
LIVE10)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.17 0.26 0.04 
CHILD 
 
Takes 1 if a person has child, otherwise takes 0.  0.77 1 0 
MARRI Takes 1 if one has a spouse, otherwise takes 0. 
 
 0.75 1 0 
DIV Takes 1 if one experienced divorce, otherwise 
takes 0. 
 
0.03 1 0 
AGE Ages 
 
49 96 20 
INCOME Household income a 
 
0.65 0.23 0 
UNIV Takes 1 if one graduated from university, 
otherwise takes 0. 
 0.15 1 0 
MALE Takes 1 if one is male, otherwise takes 0. 
 
0.47 1 0 
20 
 
 
TABLE 3  
Social capital and characteristics of residents. 
(1) Comparison of social capital between homeowner and non-homeowner. 
 Homeowner Non-homeowner t-value 
SC 1.46 1.01 12.6 ** 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
(2) Comparison of social capital between people living at their current address for 
longer than 20 years and others. 
 Longer than 20 
years 
Others t-value 
SC 1.48 1.15 10.4 ** 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of investment for social capital: All samples (OLS model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.24** 
(5.91) 
0.19** 
(4.72) 
0.19** 
(4.72) 
0.22** 
(5.39) 
LIVE20 0.17** 
(3.80) 
0.17** 
(3.71) 
0.17** 
(3.77) 
0.16** 
(3.61) 
LIVE10 0.01 
(0.19) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.007 
(0.15) 
AVHOME 
 
 0.91** 
(4.44) 
1.01** 
(6.18) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.28 
(0.93) 
 1.03** 
(3.94) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.22 
(0.48) 
 0.33 
(0.70) 
CHILD 
 
0.31** 
(5.69) 
0.30** 
(5.59) 
0.30** 
(5.59) 
0.31** 
(5.66) 
MARRI 0.20** 
(3.69) 
0.19** 
(3.60) 
0.19** 
(3.59) 
0.20** 
(3.72) 
DIV -0.09 
(-0.95) 
-0.08 
(-0.87) 
-0.08 
(-0.89) 
-0.08 
(-0.87) 
AGE 
 
0.007** 
(6.10) 
0.008** 
(6.25) 
0.008** 
(6.27) 
0.007** 
(6.12) 
INCOME 
 
-0.02 
(-0.49) 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.41) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
UNIV 
 
-0.08* 
(-1.78) 
-0.06 
(-1.42) 
-0.06 
(-1.42) 
-0.07 
(-1.60) 
MALE 
 
-0.01 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.54) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Adj R- square 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Sample size 3075 3075 3075 3075 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). A constant term is included 
when an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported to save space. * 
and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 a. YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of investment for social capital: Living in home owned by parents 
(OLS model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.26** 
(4.24) 
0.21** 
(3.31) 
0.20** 
(3.30) 
0.23** 
(3.81) 
LIVE20 0.12* 
(1.94) 
0.12* 
(1.91) 
0.12* 
(1.94) 
0.12* 
(1.85) 
LIVE10 -0.03 
(-0.46) 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.03 
(-0.43) 
AVHOME 
 
 0.89** 
(2.75) 
0.98** 
(3.68) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.35 
(0.81) 
 0.97** 
(2.57) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.60 
(0.84) 
 0.60 
(0.84) 
CHILD 
 
0.35** 
(4.25) 
0.35** 
(4.21) 
0.35** 
(4.22) 
0.35** 
(4.25) 
MARRI 0.16* 
(1.95) 
0.15* 
(1.84) 
0.15* 
(1.81) 
0.16* 
(1.93) 
DIV -0.009 
(-0.07) 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
-0.003 
(-0.03) 
AGE 
 
0.007** 
(3.35) 
0.006** 
(3.29) 
0.007** 
(3.31) 
0.006** 
(3.28) 
INCOME 
 
-0.06 
(-0.91) 
-0.07 
(-1.01) 
-0.07 
(-1.01) 
-0.06 
(-0.93) 
UNIV 
 
-0.04 
(-0.56) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.03 
(-0.42) 
MALE 
 
0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Adj R- square 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Sample size 1197 1197 1197 1197 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). A constant term is included 
when an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported to save space. * 
and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 a. YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1 
Determinants of investment for social capital (Ordered Probit 
model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.30** 
(5.89) 
0.24** 
(4.70) 
0.24** 
(4.70) 
0.27** 
(5.37) 
LIVE20 0.21** 
(3.74) 
0.20** 
(3.66) 
0.21** 
(3.71) 
0.20** 
(3.55) 
LIVE10 0.01 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.31) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
AVHOME 
 
 1.11** 
(4.41) 
1.24** 
(6.11) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.35 
(0.91) 
 1.26** 
(3.90) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.29 
(0.50) 
 0.41 
(0.73) 
CHILD 
 
0.39** 
(5.74) 
0.38** 
(5.64) 
0.38** 
(5.63) 
0.38** 
(5.71) 
MARRI 0.25** 
(3.76) 
0.24** 
(3.68) 
0.24** 
(3.66) 
0.25** 
(3.80) 
DIV -0.10 
(-0.85) 
-0.09 
(-0.76) 
-0.09 
(-0.78) 
-0.09 
(-0.77) 
AGE 
 
0.009** 
(6.10) 
0.009** 
(6.26) 
0.009** 
(6.28) 
0.009** 
(6.12) 
INCOME 
 
-0.02 
(-0.53) 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.44) 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
UNIV 
 
-0.09* 
(-1.66) 
-0.07 
(-1.31) 
-0.07 
(-1.32) 
-0.08 
(-1.48) 
MALE 
 
-0.01 
(-0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
-0.02 
(-0.54) 
-0.02 
(-0.52) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- 
square 
0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Sample size 3075 3075 3075 3075 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). * and ** indicate significance 
at 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 a. YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A2  
Determinants of investment for social capital: Living in home owned by parents 
(Ordered Probit model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.32** 
(4.23) 
0.26** 
(3.30) 
0.26** 
(3.29) 
0.29** 
(3.79) 
LIVE20 0.15* 
(1.86) 
0.15* 
(1.85) 
0.15* 
(1.86) 
0.14* 
(1.78) 
LIVE10 -0.05 
(-0.57) 
-0.04 
(-0.47) 
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
-0.05 
(-0.54) 
AVHOME 
 
 1.11** 
(2.76) 
1.21** 
(3.63) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.40 
(0.73) 
 1.17** 
(2.47) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.72 
(0.80) 
 0.70 
(0.79) 
CHILD 
 
0.44** 
(4.27) 
0.44** 
(4.23) 
0.44** 
(4.24) 
0.44** 
(4.27) 
MARRI 0.20* 
(2.00) 
0.19* 
(1.89) 
0.19* 
(1.85) 
0.20* 
(1.99) 
DIV -0.004 
(-0.03) 
-0.005 
(-0.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
AGE 
 
0.008** 
(3.29) 
0.008** 
(3.25) 
0.008** 
(3.27) 
0.008** 
(3.22) 
INCOME 
 
-0.09 
(-1.00) 
-0.10 
(-1.08) 
-0.10 
(-1.09) 
-0.09 
(-1.02) 
UNIV 
 
-0.03 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
MALE 
 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
0.005 
(0.08) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- 
square 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Sample size 1197 1197 1197 1197 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). * and ** indicate significance 
at 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 a. YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
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